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CONSUMING GOVERNMENT
Richard Schragger*
THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME vALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND

By William A.
Press. 2001. Pp. xi, 329. $45.

USE POLICIES.

Fischel.

Cambridge: Harvard University

In his ambitious new book, William Fischel, a Professor of Eco
nomics at Dartmouth College, gives us a new political animal: "The
Homevoter." The homevoter is simply a homeowner who votes (p. ix).
According to Fischel, she is the key to understanding the political
economy of American local government. By implication, she is the key
to understanding state and national government as well.
Homeowners warrant special attention because "residents who
own their own homes have a stake in the outcome of local politics that
make them especially attentive to the public policies of local govern
ment" (p. ix). That is because local decisions - about how much to
spend on schools or trash pick-up, for instance - directly affect home
values in ways that most state or national decisions do not. The
"homevoter hypothesis" is deceptively straightforward: decentralized,
local governments provide a desirable balance of taxes and govern
ment services because the homevoter seeks to maintain or increase the
value of her single largest asset - the family home (pp. 4-6). The
homevoter explains why local governments "work better at providing
local services than do larger-area governments" (p. x).
This plausible sounding thesis has its roots deep in the decentral
izing tradition of public finance theory. The idea that multiple local
governments provide government services more efficiently than does a
centralized government originated with Charles Tiebout's seminal ar
ticle, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.1 Tiebout's solution to the
problem of how to ensure the proper level of expenditures on public
goods was to posit a market in public services. In his model, multiple
local governments offer distinctive tax and spending packages, and
"consumer-voters" choose to reside in jurisdictions that best fit their
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Pennsylvania; M.A. 1 993, University of London; J.D. 1 996, Harvard. - Ed. Many thanks to
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1 . Charles Tiebout. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1 956).
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preferences, exiting those jurisdictions that do not.2 The notion that
consumers of public goods "vote with their feet" by choosing where to
live has become something of an economic maxim.3
Fischel amply recognizes his debt to Tiebout (the book is dedi
cated to him): the homevoter hypothesis relies on the same market
mechanism to monitor the fiscal decisions of local governments.
Fischel's contribution is connecting the market in local services to a
political account of local behavior driven by housing prices: Tiebout's
"consumer-voter" becomes Fischel's "homevoter." The resulting
portrait of the political economy of local government is one in which
homeowners assess every local decision - from education policy to
who moves in next door - for its impact on property values, which
are defended at all costs.
In other words, the homevoter hypothesis is a portrait of the politi
cal economy of the suburbs and an account of the political behavior of
the suburban voter. Much of the academic literature on the suburbs is
critical, bemoaning the homogeneity and parochialism· of suburban
life, the decline of the city, and, more recently, the rise of sprawl.4
Fischel, however, embraces the suburb, pointing out that more than
half the American population now resides there (p. 1 5). And he turns
what some would consider the suburb's leading vice - its residents'
obsession with property values - into its leading virtue. In praising
the ideal of decentralized, home-centered local government, Fischel
rejects as unsound the entire panoply of progressive-minded, "good
government" reform proposals of the last forty years: municipal
consolidation, metropolitan property-tax-base sharing, education
funding equalization, and metropolitan-area or statewide land use
reform (pp. 1 -3). Fischel argues that these reforms undermine the
homevoter's incentive to invest in local public services because they
sever the link between property values and government policy.
Homevoters, Fischel claims, favor locally funded and provided public
services because local services are an investment in their primary
asset. If they do not see a return on this investment, they will stop
investing. Indeed, the homevoter's desire to increase the value of her
2. Id. at 419.
3. As Fischel notes, "The metaphor 'voting with one's feet' is older than Tiebout's eco
nomic exposition of it. (Tiebout did not actually use the term.)." P. 73.
4. There is an extensive literature critical of the dominant American model of suburban
development. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA
( 1994); PETER DREIER ET AL., Pt.A.CE MATTERS: METROPOLITICS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2001 ); ANDRES D UANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND
THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2000); GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING:
B U ILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (2000); JAMES KUNTSLER, THE
GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICA'S MANMADE
LANDSCAPE ( 1993); MYRON 0RFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN
REALITY (2002); NEAL R. PEIRCE, CITISTATES: How URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A
COMPETITIVE WORLD ( 1993); DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (2d ed. 1995).
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property results in "a race to the top in public education and environ
mental protection instead of, as is commonly alleged, a race to the
bottom" (p. ix).
There is certainly something about Fischel's account. The subur
banite's obsession with property values has been often observed, and
the suburban voter seems to dominate local, state, and even national
politics. This may be why she has been so successful at resisting efforts
to reform the existing fragmented system of local government. Never
theless, the homevoter hypothesis is highly stylized as a descriptive
matter. In the first place, it is difficult to pin down precisely where the
homevoter lives. Fischel quickly eliminates cities as either relevant or
important as a matter of local political economy because (as he
argues) only a small percentage of Americans live there.5 In light of
the important role urban centers play in generating and controlling re
gional (not to mention global) cultural, financial, and political capital,
this marginalization of cities should be controversial in itself. But even
if one puts cities aside, it is not clear that most homeowners act like
rational property-value-maximizing agents all the time, or that most
local governments can or do cater to their desires. The political
economy of local government is complex, and Fischel's model often
fails to take into account the varied motivations of local actors and the
actual powers of local governments.
To the extent that Fischel does capture a subset of the suburban
political economy, one then has to ask whether this is an attractive
form of local governance. Fischel likes - and wants us to like - the
homevoter. His normative claims, however, are just as stylized as his
descriptive ones. In a local political economy premised on property
values, virtually all the homevoter's energy is directed towards guard
ing the jurisdictional gates of her community. Fischel recognizes that
homevoters are also NIMBY ("Not-In-My-Backyard") voters (pp. 810), and he offers some suggestions in his last chapter to suppress bad
homevoter motivations. He is seemingly less aware of the distribu
tional consequences of a political economy that gives the homevoter
almost unfettered control over who gets to move in next door and that
reduces significantly the options for those who are barred. The losers
in the interlocal competition for low-cost, high-tax-base homeowners
- the urban poor, racial minorities, families in search of affordable
housing, the elderly - are nowhere to be found in his account of local
power.
I begin my ·Review by describing how Fischel's economic and
political theory generates a privatized account of local government,
one in which public services are distributed according to ability to pay.
5. See p. 15. Fischel observes that "(o]nly about a quarter of the U.S. population lives in
a municipality with more than 100,000 people," and (more provocatively) that "big cities by
themselves are not all that important anymore." P. 1 5.
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Part II highlights some of the descriptive limitations of this account.
Part III shifts to normative ground, focusing on the losers in
the "property-values game" - namely those residents who are
undesirable from a public finance perspective. Part IV turns to the
most significant public service that local governments provide primary and secondary education - and examines Fischel's argument
that education is properly funded through local property tax revenues.
Parts V and VI describe how suburbanized local government has
become a constitutional value, and challenges the conception of local
autonomy that equates self-government with consumption. Part VI
also suggests that an alternative to our current localism - one that
takes into account the interlocal costs of decentralized decisionmaking
- is virtually unavoidable. I conclude with some thoughts about why
the market model of local government continues to be so attractive
despite its limitations.
I.

THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZED LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Fischel describes and defends a market mechanism for the distri
bution of public services. Local government works well because there
are multiple local governments offering many tax and spending
packages, and because these tax and spending decisions directly affect
people's pocketbooks through their home values. These are the key
elements of the homevoter hypothesis: Tieboutian competition among
various local governments and capitalization of local government poli
cies into residential property values (Chapter 3). The bottom line for
Fischel is that the provision of local public goods approximates a
market. The consequence of the market is that public goods are dis
tributed (as in markets for private goods) according to one's ability to
pay.6
To understand this market model of local public services, we have
to begin with Tiebout's theory of local expenditures. Tiebout's device
for properly allotting public goods was migration: "Moving or failing
to move replaces the usual market test of willingness to buy a good
and reveals the consumer-voter's demand for public goods."7 In order
for consumer-voters to "vote with their feet," Tiebout posited that
there were a large number of communities in which a consumer-voter
could choose to live, that she would have full knowledge of her avail6. Economists have contended for quite some time that the local public economy re
sembles a market. See, e.g. , B ruce Hamilton et al., The Tiebout Hypothesis and Residential
Income Segregation, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 101 (Edwin S. Mills &
Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975) ("There is a growing consensus among economists, the courts,
and the public that local public services, most notably primary and secondary education, are
distributed largely according to ability to pay. In the language of economists, the local public
economy resembles a market.").
7. Tiebout, supra note 1, at 420.
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able options, and, most of all, that she would not be limited by
resource constraints, employment opportunities, or other constraints
on her ability to relocate.8 Tiebout assumed perfect mobility because
without it consumer-voters could not "exit" a jurisdiction that was not
providing the preferred combination of taxes and public goods.
The assumption of perfect mobility is easily criticized as unrealis
tic,9 though it can serve as a useful ideal in pursuing redistributive
policies. If one's goal is Tieboutian efficiency, one might seek to adopt
policies that increase individuals' ability to choose where to live.10
Fischel, however, following on the heels of work by economist Bruce
Hamilton,1 1 has mostly jettisoned the idea of perfect mobility. Indeed,
in his modified Tieboutian world, local governments must be able to
restrict new in-migrants by limiting or eliminating the provision of new
housing.12 It is restrictions on mobility that are necessary for the system
to function (p. 51). These restrictions come in the form of zoning laws,
which allow existing homeowners to put up (often impenetrable)
barriers to entry of newcomers. So-called "fiscal zoning" - minimum
acreage requirements, minimum square footage requirements, and
outright limitations on multi-family housing - is a common (and
much condemned) suburban strategy to limit development and ensure
that newcomers purchase a minimum level of housing. Fischel makes
fiscal zoning the linchpin of his political economy (pp. 51-57).
Zoning is critical for maintaining the link between property values
and the quality of local public services because it allows "homeowners
to control net additions" to the jurisdiction (p. 52). Here is how
it works: On Fischel's theory, home prices reflect the good and bad
policies that local governments adopt - in economic terms, local tax
ing and spending decisions are "capitalized" into house values. This
is a good thing, because it gives homevoters a strong incentive to
monitor local behavior and invest in those amenities - like schools that will maintain or contribute to higher property values. In the per8. Id. at 419.
9. See, e.g. , Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part fl - Loca/ism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 420 (1990) (hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part fl] (criticizing
mobility thesis); Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebottt Model, 71 AM. ECON.
REV. 93, 93 (1981 ) (stating that the Tiebout model "involves a set of assumptions so patently
unrealistic as to verge on the outrageous"); see also Gerald Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 23 ( 1 998) (challenging the assumptions of the Tiebout model).
1 0. See, e.g., Georgette C. Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal
City, 1 45 U. PA. L. REV. 607 (1997) (arguing in favor of region-wide wealth redistribution to
encourage individual choice at the local level).
1 1 . See Bruce W. Hamilton, Property Taxes and the Tiebout Hypothesis: Some Empirical
Evidence, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, supra note 6, at 13.
12. Seep. 5 1. Tiebout's original model does include reference to zoning as a mechanism
for preventing over-migration into any one community, though Tiebout assumed that there
would be no resource constraints preventing the creation of new optimally sized communi
ties offering similar amenities. See Tiebout, supra note 1, at 420.
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feet homevoter world, if a local government raises property taxes to
build a new high school, that tax increase should be offset by a corre
sponding increase in the homevoters' property values (pp. 47-51). But
for capitalization to work, existing homeowners must own a scarce and
desirable item that they can sell on the housing market - not just a
home, but a home in a particular jurisdiction that has recently invested
in a new high school.
Zoning, and the entire regime of land-use controls, is the mecha
nism for ensuring scarcity. Zoning restricts the development of new
housing in the jurisdiction, thus ensuring that all the benefits of local
investment accrue to existing homeowners in the form of increased
property values. It makes buying a house of a certain value a prerequi
site for entry into the jurisdiction, ensuring that the cost of new
entrants is offset by what they pay in property taxes. And it controls
for overcrowding, ensuring that local public goods that are susceptible
to overuse (like a school) are not devalued by congestion (pp. 51-59).
The housing market is thus the engine for the distribution of public
services. The device for pegging property values to the quality of local
public goods is zoning, which provides residents with a collective
property right to exclude others from the jurisdiction analogous to
their individual property right to exclude others from their homes (p.
54). On this model, the local public schools and other "public" ameni
ties of the jurisdiction are not "free" at all; they have been paid for up
front through the price of one's home (pp. 40-42). The homevoter's
goal is good services at lower cost, and because both taxes and the
quality of services will be capitalized into the value of the home, the
homevoter can immediately see how her local government is doing.
Higher house prices indicate lower taxes and better public services;
lower house prices indicate higher taxes and worse public services.
The market discipline of house values compels homevoters to seek out
and encourage the former rather than the latter.
II. LOCATING THE HOMEVOTER
The central idea of the homevoter hypothesis, then, is that prop
erty .values and local government tax and spending decisions are fused.
The distribution of public goods hitches a ride on the private housing
market and the distribution of combined housing/local government
products can proceed as do all fairly competitive markets. This model
functions, however, only by making a number of fairly heroic assump
tions about the efficiency of the housing market and the behavior of
homeowners and local government officials. First, both the good and
bad effects of local decisions actually have to be capitalized in prop
erty values; second, local government officials must be able to control
for local fiscal effects and be able and willing to respond to homeown-
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ers' desires; and third, homeowners must prioritize property values
above all else.
Fischel's first claim - that local. government decisions are
reflected in house values - has intuitive appeal. Anyone who has ever
purchased a home knows that the price of a particular house reflects a
myriad of characteristics of the neighborhood, such as the quality of
local schools or the availability of local amenities. Capitalization is not
a foregone conclusion, however. If capitalization of tax and spending
decisions is low, the incentives for local monitoring weaken or disap
pear altogether, and the homeowner's fiscal incentives are dramati
cally muted.
In fact, capitalization studies have been somewhat mixed, enough
for one author to write recently that "[a] continuing debate questions
whether capitalization of taxes and public services into house price
occurs."13 As Fischel recognizes, even optimistic accounts of capitaliza
tion require that localities enforce rigid limits on new housing produc
tion (pp. 51-52). Without land use limitations, developers will respond
to the increased demand for housing in the more desirable j urisdiction
by building there, thus increasing supply and erasing any capitalization
gains.14 Capitalization, in other words, may be more significant in non
de'veloping, old-line suburbs, like those found in the Northeast, but
much less so in the growth belts of the South and the West, where
there is ample room for development. This means that as a descriptive
matter we need to know something about local housing markets to
know if home values are a good barometer of local behavior.
The effect of local government behavior on property values
becomes even more difficult to assess once one tries to establish a link
between house values and specific local government policies. Fischel's
second assumption is that local government officials have the fiscal
ability and political power to respond to downward shifts in home
values. As a matter of state law, this simply may not be the case: local
governments are often constrained by state constitutional or statutory
limitations in their ability to raise taxes, assume debt, or otherwise
alter their mix of taxes and services.15 Moreover, for house prices to
serve as a meaningful discipline on local government behavior, there
must be a visible one-to-one relationship between the costs and bene
fits of a local decision. The decision to build a new performing arts
13. David M. Brasington, Edge Versus Center: Finding Common Ground in the Capitali
zation Debate, 52 J. URB. ECON. 524, 524 (2002).
14. See id. at 526.
15. These include state taxing ceilings. debt limitations, and unfunded mandates. See
DANIEL MANDELKER ET.AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
243-48, 265, 347-49, 389-92 (2002); MARK SCHNEIDER, THE COMPETITIVE CITY: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUBURBIA 41 (1989) (discussing "intergovernmental rules and
regulations restricting both the flow of money into the community and its freedom to design
the service/tax product mix it wants to offer" ) .
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center, invite a job-creating industry into the locality, or license a local
landfill has to include all the decisions' costs and benefits. Yet in each
of these cases, it is probable that the full costs and benefits of the local
decision are not borne solely by the residents of the jurisdiction. Users
of local amenities regularly cross borders to do so, and the costs of
local siting decisions regularly fall on neighboring jurisdictions.
The existence of externalities means that the quality or availability
of "local" amenities is often beyond the control of a specific local
government or the homeowners who vote within it. Fischel tends to
treat localities as isolated, autonomous actors: the hypothesis works
because homevoters - like corporate shareholders - can trace the
value of their housing investment directly back to the decisions made
by the locality. But much of the value of one's housing investment negative or positive - might very well turn on the specific decisions,
activities, or fiscal health of neighboring jurisdictions.16
Fischel has no place in his political economy for interlocal or re
gional effects. He seems to assume that the costs and benefits of local
decisions stay within the jurisdiction, are captured by housing prices
there, and thus can be rationally accounted for by home-owning resi
dents when they and their elected representatives make local political
decisions. Yet if regional or interlocal spillover effects dominate home
values, then local governments may have little ability significantly to
affect the primary determinants of shifting property values.17
Fischel's shareholder analogy assumes not only that local office
holders are capable of responding to homevoter pressure to maintain
or improve home values, but that they are also willing to do so. Once
again analogizing local governments to corporate firms, Fischel argues
that local office holders serve as "deliberate, value-maximizing
agents" (p. 220) of their homeowning constituents. Fischel claims that
in contrast to larger jurisdictions like big cities, where special interests
are able to exercise significant political power, the majority tends to
get what it wants in small-scale residential jurisdictions dominated by
homeowners (p. 87). The politics of local government, Fischel claims,
16. For example, there is increasing evidence that a fiscally weakened central city de
presses both the local urban economy and the surrounding suburban economy. This finding
lends support to those who have advocated cross-border revenue sharing on the theory that
"(e]conomies don't stop at the city's edge." See Andrew F. H aughwout & Robert P. Inman,
Should Suburbs Help Their Central City?, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN
AFFAIRS: 2002, at 45, 45-46 (William G. G ale & Rothenberg J. Pack eds., 2002).
17. Indeed, m acroeconomic conditions such as l arge-scale shifts in employment something local governments h ave little control over - m ay have more to do with local fis
cal health than the specific taxing and spending decisions of local governments. See
SCHNEIDER, supra note 15, at 40-41, 130-31 (observing that "policy effects are often quite
small compared to the importance of demographic factors"). After studying a range of
strategies suburbs employ to obtain higher service-to-tax ratios, Schneider concludes that
"(a]t bottom line, local government policies are relatively ineffective in producing the out
comes local actors want." Id. at 210.

1 832

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:1824

is the politics of the "median voter," and the median voter in the sub
urbs is the homevoter. Local officials have learned that they neglect
these constituents at their peril.
This description of homeowner majoritarianism is certainly con
trary to those who have a more skeptical view of the motives of gov
ernment bureaucrats.1 8 Though there is some evidence that small-scale
jurisdictions follow a median voter model, Fischel is too quick to dis
miss the influence of developers, commercial interests, and local elites
on the politics of small places.19 These actors have a significant stake in
local decisions that makes them particularly eager to influence local
decisionmakers, and that may make small localities more susceptible
to what Clayton Gillette has called "one-sided" bargaining.20 In local
jurisdictions that contain large institutional or commercial players, or
significant owners of vacant, developable land, homeowners may play
a less dominant role.21
Indeed, Fischel's home-based, suburban politics sounds somewhat
nostalgic in an America that is increasingly dominated by large,
urbanized metropolitan regions. While Fischel's claim that most
Americans live in municipalities with less than 100,000 residents may
be formally true, the size of any particular municipality seems beside
the point. In fact, the bulk of Americans live in large metropolitan

18. One model asserts that public officials are primarily interested in expanding their
own budgets as a way of aggrandizing their power. See, e.g. , ANTHONY DOWNS, INSID E
BUREAUCRACY (1967); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., B UREAUCRACY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 5-12 (1971); AARON WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE
BUDGETARY PROCESS (4th ed. 1984).
19. For a case study that takes into account the elaborate politics of one suburban
county, see Stephanie Pincetl, The Politics of Influence: Democracy and the Growth Machine
in Orange County, U.S. , in THE URBAN GROWTH MACHINE: CR!TlCAL PERSPECTIVES Two
D ECADES LATER 195 (Andrew E. G. Jonas & David Wilson eds., 1999) [hereinafter THE
U RBAN GROWTH MACHINE).
20. Clayton Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory
Justify Local Government Law, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959 (1994).
21. As Fischel observes, the dominant literature asserts that local politics tends to be
driven by prodevelopment elites in a quest to expand the local economy and accumulate
wealth. P. 15. See H arvey Molotch, The City as Growth Machine: Toward a Political Econ
omy of Place, 82 AM. J. Soc. 309 (1976). Molotch, who invented the "growth machine" the
sis, continues to adhere to it, arguing that "[w)hile we tend to think of neighborhood leaders,
environmentalists, and 'no growthers' as inciting conflict over land use issues, it is the devel
opers who are the omnipresent activists. That we think of developers' maneuvers as the
baseline of urban process, rather than as 'disruption' or even 'activism,' shows just how much
we take their political presence for granted." H arvey Molotch, The Political Economy of
Growth Machines, 15 J. URB. AFF. 29, 32 (1993). There is some evidence that the ability for
a locality to resist the political pressure brought by prodevelopment elites may depend sig
nificantly on its residents' education and income level. See John R. Logan et al., The Char
acter and Consequences of Growth Regimes: An Assessment of Twenty Years of Research, in
THE URBAN GROWTH MACHINE, supra note 19, at 73, 81-83. Fischel concedes that "devel
opers and their allies are active players in municipal affairs even in small cities." P. 15.
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areas with effective populations much greater than 100,000,22 are par
ticipants in regional political economies, and are subject to regional
political pressures that have not respected formal jurisdictional
boundaries for quite some time.
Homeowners are unlikely to be the dominant political force in
these metropolitan regions. As commentators have pointed out, many
formally "residential" locales now contain more office or retail space
than nearby central cities.23 This emergent "post-suburban" metropolis
- an interdependent mix of "business, retail, housing, and entertain
ment focal points scattered about the low-density cityscape"24 requires a redefinition of "city" and "suburb" and a more nuanced
portrait of local politics along the urban-suburban fringe than Fischel's
model provides.
Moreover, even in small-scale, predominantly residential locations,
homeowners may have more complicated motives than Fischel
acknowledges. The last critical assumption of the homevoter. hypothe
sis is that homeowners prioritize wealth maximization in the form of
higher property values above all else. Putting aside for a moment the
general validity of Fischel's public choice assumptions,25 it is not clear
that homeowner interests are exhausted by property wealth maximiza
tion. Certainly, property values are important to the suburban voter,
but, as Fischel observes (with some puzzlement), many homeowners
even object to property-value-enhancing local decisions (p. 9). Fischel
has to explain this "irrational" resistance as an example of risk aver
sion - homeowners simply cannot be certain whether a local policy
decision will have adverse effects. Because their homes are their single
largest assets, homeowners are going to err on the side of caution and

22. Fischel's choice of a "rough threshold" population size of 100,000 at which home
owners stop being politically effective, p. 92, seems at best arbitrary and at worst an attempt
to save his model from being descriptively irrelevant for a significant percentage of the
American population. The overwhelming majority of Americans live in metropolitan statis
tical areas with populations of more than 250,000. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 2001, tbl.29; see also WILLIAM FREY ET AL. , AMERICA
BY THE NUMBERS: A FIELD GUIDE TO THE US POPULATION 68-69 (2001) (fewer than 25%
of Americans live outside an "urban" area).
23. See JON TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE EDGE
CITIES 165 (1997).
24. Id. at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Teaford observes, "Basic to the
emerging post-suburban polity is the tension between suburban ideals and post-suburban
realities." Id. at 5. For additional accounts of the post-suburban reality, see ROBERT
FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS: THE RISE AND FALL OF SUBURBIA (1987), and JOEL
GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER (1991).
25. Fischel adopts the public choice assumption that individuals vote their material in
terests. For a recent summary of the arguments questioning the rational-actor assumptions
of public choice theory, see Edward Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning
of the Modern State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out that Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
309, 320-21 (2002).
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reject most local government policy changes that have uncertain
effects (p. 10).
This explanation avoids other, perhaps more obvious, possibilities.
Even a rational homeowner may be more sensitive to a significant
short-term rise in property taxes that follows from increased property
values than to underinvestment in long-term municipal services, like
the school system.26 It is fairly common for local majorities to reject
school bond issues even though an investment in schools should bring
concomitant benefits in property values, perhaps because homeowners
cannot calculate the value of the long-term investment, or simply do
not want to pay higher taxes in the short term. More significantly, the
homeowner may fail to treat her home as a commodity altogether, but
choose instead to enhance its personal value at the expense of its
market value.27 A homeowner may "rationally" reject a property
value-enhancing new development project because she prefers to
retain the rural quality of her neighborhood, is sensitive to issues of
sprawl, or is simply uncomfortable with the pace of change in her
neighborhood.
In short, the homevoter only exists to the extent that homeowners
have the capacity and desire to act like ideal (profit-maximizing) cor
porate shareholders, that local officials have the capacity and desire
to act like ideal corporate boards, and that both have a suitable
mechanism in property values to judge the profitability of their collec
tive enterprise. Local citizens and their officials are too imperfect and most local communities are too complex and fluid - to be
captured by this construct.
Ill. THE PROPERTY VALUES GAME
Undoubtedly, some residential communities come closer than
others to Fischel's ideal of the shareholder-value-enhancing corporate
enclave. Indeed, though his model is highly stylized, Fischel has cap
tured a central characteristic of the suburban political economy: the
fact that local public services are increasingly being distributed
according to ability to pay. Recall that in a homevoter-dominated local
government, house price serves as the cost of entry into the j urisdic
tion and buys locally provided amenities and the right to control
(through zoning) the price charged to new entrants. Land use laws
26. See, e.g., Bev McCarron, School Board Nervous About Budgets - Many Districts are
Asking Voters to Accept Higher Taxes or Live Without Some Programs, NEWARK STAR
LEDGER, Apr. 14, 2002, at 21 (reporting that state budgetary shortfall has put New Jersey
towns in the awkward and unpopular position of having to raise property taxes and quoting
one borough council member as saying: "They are split down the middle. People on fixed
income are not going to go for it.").
27. See, e.g. , Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957
(1982) (discussing personhood value of one's home).
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ensure that potential in-migrants who cannot afford the price do not
gain entry into the jurisdiction. The homevoter hypothesis captures
the mechanism by which suburban local government has essentially
become privatized.28
The immediate objection to allocating local public goods based on
ability to pay sounds in distributive j ustice. Fischel is so intent on
proving that dramatic interlocal differences in service provision and
tax rates are not "unfair" because those differences are reflected in
house prices29 that he ignores the more thoroughgoing objection that
the quality of local public services should not be a function of house
price at all. The commodification objection states that certain basic
public goods like edU<::ation, environmental quality, sanitation, hous
ing, and policing should be provided on a relatively equal basis re
gardless of individuals' private resources. The normative intuition that
it is unjust to distribute public services based on ability to pay ani
mates the fair housing, school funding equalization, and environ
mental justice movements.
But one can put aside this more global critique and still question
the desirability of the homevoter model. The test of the homevoter
hypothesis - and the one that Fischel sets for himself - is whether
·

28. The closest real-world analog to Fischel's hypothetical local government is one he
barely mentions: the private residential community association or homeowners association.
Perhaps the most popular form of residential development in the United States today, see
ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 5 (1992) (observing that 30 million Americans
were subject to RCA governance in 1992, with that number expected to double in less than
15 years), homeowners associations tend to be fully residential, homogenous along socio
economic and racial lines, relatively self-contained, and increasingly self-sufficient. See id. at
pp. 61-103. Members "buy into" the community by purchasing property there, which gives
the members access to local amenities and subjects them to an often elaborate array of
covenants, rules, and regulations ("CC&Rs") that govern the use of individual and common
property within the association. Moreover, in most states, voting rights for association
boards of directors are distributed based on members' property ownership interests. See
Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1543
(1982). Homeowners associations are explicitly committed - in both name, institutional
structure, and purpose - to protecting the interests of their homeowning residents. If the
homevoter can be found anywhere, it is there.
Fischel's failure to embrace this obvious haunt of the robust homevoter is somewhat
puzzling. If local public services are distributed according to market criteria then why not
dispense with public local government altogether and let the private sector provide local
amenities, as others who have written in the Tiebout-inspired tradition have suggested? See
id. Fischel never arrives at that conclusion, perhaps because he believes that homevoter
dominated governments are already the equivalent of homeowners associations. In a
homevoter-dominated local government, as in a homeowners association, house price serves
as the cost of entry into the jurisdiction and buys locally provided amenities and the right to
control the price charged to new entrants.
29. See pp. 40-42. Fischel explains that he served as an expert witness in the New Hamp
shire school funding equalization case, Claremont v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997),
arguing on behalf of the state-defendant that high local tax rates were not "unfair" to tax
payers because they were offset by lower house prices. Pp. 40-42.; see also William A. Fis
chel, Home is Where Our Interests Are: The Way We Value Houses from Town to Town is
Fairer Than You Might Think, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Apr. 14, 2002, at El.
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the current structure of home values local government encourages
citizens to act in socially desirable ways (pp. 16-18). Whether one un
derstands social desirability in efficiency or distributional terms, Fis
chel's endorsement of the homevoter's political economy is norma
tively troubling.
Indeed, Fischel's praise for the homevoter is somewhat puzzling in
light of the fact that her political economy is based on the legal right to
exclude. Local government works for the homevoter only because she
has been empowered to keep lower-income, higher-cost newcomers
out of her neighborhood: her incentives are explicitly defensive and
separationist. His praise is even more puzzling when one considers the
litany of costs that flow from the homevoter's defensive posture: the
sprawling, inefficient use of land and associated costs in terms of infra
structure investment, commuting times, social isolation, and environ
mental quality; the concentration of the poor in urban cores with
dwindling tax bases and reduced city services; and the extreme segre
gation of Americans by race and income.
These costs have been amply described by critics, and I cannot
possibly recount them all here.30 But it may be a useful antidote to
Fischel's optimism to focus - at least briefly - on a few of the losers
in the "property values game." While Fischel acknowledges from the
start that the homevoter is the NIMBY voter (pp. 9-10), and that there
are costs associated with inefficient, low-density development (pp.
229-32), he has comparatively little to offer those concerned about
racial and income segregation and the plight of postindustrial cities.
Racial minorities and the urban poor do not fare particularly well
under the homevoter hypothesis.
Indeed, the book's most glaring omission is any sustained treat
ment of race as a component of the homevoter's political economy. In
reviewing the history of the municipal corporation and the develop
ment of zoning, Fischel fails to note how suburban local governments
were explicitly racialized from their inception.31 Developers, banks,

30. For critiques from legal scholars, see FRUG, supra note 4; Briffault, Our Localism:
Part II, supra note 9; William Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institu
tional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57 (1999); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self
Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: A ddressing the Barriers to New Regional
ism, 88 G EO. L.J. 1 985 (2000); Richard Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843 ( 1 994).
3 1 . Fischel's failure to mention racism as a factor in the development of zoning seems
almost willful. Though he identifies apartment buildings as "threats" to the "autonomous
character" of the suburbs, p. 213, and observes that " (b]y the 1920's, zoning was the only
practical way to protect residential neighborhoods from the newly footloose industrial and
apartment developments," p. 215, he studiously avoids one of the primary motivations for
limitations on multi-family housing: the race or ethnicity of the people who might occupy it.
For discussions of zoning's racialized origins, see CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS
PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE IN AMERICA 1 93-209 (1977), and Richard H.
Chused, Euclid's Historical Imagery, S L CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 603- 1 4 (2001).
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and federal and state lending agencies drew explicit racial lines around
new suburban developments, which were sold as buffers against
the ethnic and black masses of the city.32 Nor does he mention that
homevoters still remain overwhelmingly white. Homeownership
is heavily correlated with race: in 2002, 74.5% of non-Hispanic
whites owned their homes, but only 47.3% of blacks, and 48.2% of
Hispanics.33 And finally, Fischel does not mention how suburban local
governments have provided the jurisdictional opportunity necessary
for whites to flee the central cities.
Perhaps Fischel does not address white flight directly because it is
an embarrassment for the homevoter hypothesis. By hitching a ride on
the housing market, a local political economy based on property val
ues smuggles in all the values of that market, benign and pernicious.
Fischel tacitly assumes that market values will be positive - that
policies that increase house prices will be socially beneficial ones. But,
of course, the market's values need not be benign at all, and in the
case of race, have proven not to be. As Richard Ford has persuasively
argued, even in the absence of discriminatory intentions, the current
structure of locally funded public services can lead to (and does fur
ther entrench preexisting) segregation.34 When the property tax is the
primary means of funding local services, homeowners have a powerful
incentive to exclude lower-income, higher-cost newcomers. Because
race is correlated with income, it may be market-rational for the hom
evoter to use race as a cue for higher cost.35 This incentive is amplified
if the bulk of the home-buying population is even mildly racist or
maintains a preference to be the majority race in a particular jurisdic
tion. Because she will want to cater to the largest segment of home
buyers, the homevoter will want to be aware to what extent the hous
ing market values skin color.36 Binding local services to property
values reinforces the financial gains of segregation.
Fischel briefly argues that racially and economically heterogeneous
local governments are possible because diversity might be a selling
point for certain homebuyers (pp. 68-70). These well-meaning home
buyers, however, are taking an extraordinary risk that the market will
value diversity independently from the fiscal signals that having racial
32. See Peter L. Abeles, Planning and Zoning, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN D REAM
1 22, 132-34, 1 37 (Charles M. Harr & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1 989).
33. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSING VACANCIES AND HOMEOWNERSHIP,
ANNUAL STATISTICS: 2001, tbl. 20 (2001).
34. Ford, supra note 30, at 1849-57; see also Alex Johnson, Jr. How Race and Poverty
Intersect to Prevent Integration: Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1595 ( 1995).
.

35. Ford, supra note 30, at 1853-54.
36. Cf Jan Brueckner & Man-Soo Joo, Voting With Capitalization, 21 REG. SCI . & URB.
ECON. 453, 464 ( 1991) (arguing that the voter's ideal level of public spending reflects a blend
of his own preferences and those of the eventual buyer of his house).
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minorities in the neighborhood sends. Permitting racial minorities to
enter the jurisdiction will tend to lower existing owners' property val
ues, either because these lower-income arrivals actually increase the
costs on existing owners without offsetting benefits, or because these
minority arrivals are perceived to increase costs on existing homeown
ers. Moreover, the market in diversity is a limited one: when asked to
define an "integrated" community, whites generally respond with 20%
minority; blacks consider "integration" closer to 50%.37 The difference
in perceptions shows up in the housing market as a tipping point: black
in-migration has to be capped at the lower preference or there will be
no residential mixing at all because even whites with a preference for
integration will exit before blacks with a preference for integration are
satisfied.
The current extreme segregation of American metropolitan
regions owes a great deal to the power of localities to restrict in
migrants based on income. Urban cores and inner-ring suburbs con
tain the bulk of racial minorities (and lower-income persons), while
outer-ring suburbs are almost completely white or, in the few cases of
affluent black suburbs, almost completely black.38 Despite this obvious
demographic evidence, Fischel has an almost utopian faith in the
housing market to sort everything out. Mentioning three moderately
integrated communities, Fischel declares that "the casual evidence is
that [racial integration] has done nothing bad to their housing prices"
(pp. 69-70). The "casualness" of the accepted evidence is a somewhat
telling statement from an author who is not normally shy about
invoking empirical evidence to support his contentions. In truth, the
very paucity of integrated communities belies their market success.39
What the demographic evidence does show is the separation and
concentration of races into homogenous suburbs and declining, post
industrial (largely minority) cities. For Fischel, the housing market is
37. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, .The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1965, 1 987 (2000).
38. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A
Post-lntegrationist Vision for Metropolitan A merica, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729 (2001 ) ; see
also DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). As Edwin Mills and Wallace Oates observe, the
"Tiebout model implies powerful tendencies toward segregation by income level." Edwin S.
Mills & Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Local Public Finance: Its Relevance to Urban Fiscal
and Zoning Behavior, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, supra note 6, at 5
[hereinafter Mills & Oates, The Theory of Local.Public Finance].
39. While it is true that segregation levels between blacks and non-blacks have been de
creasing since the 1 970s, the rate of decline has been "glacial." Cashin, supra note 38, at 73839 ("It would take another seventy-seven years for . . . [northern metropolitan areas] just to
reach the upper bound of the range for moderate segregation."). Even optimistic accounts of
desegregation note that " [t]he large number of metropolitan areas with extremely high levels
of segregation remains quite striking." EDWARD L. G LAESER & JACOB L. VIGDOR, RACIAL
SEGREGATION IN THE 2000 CENSUS: PROMISING NEWS 4 (Brookings Institute, Survey Se
ries, April 2001 ).

May 2003]

Consuming Government

1839

the answer to the latter's woes as well. Take Camden, New Jersey, for
instance. Camden, along with the neighboring suburb of Mount
Laurel, was the setting for the New Jersey Supreme Court's famous
Mount Laurel decision outlawing suburban fiscal zoning.40 In the
case of Camden, middle- and upper-income white (and some black)
families fled to the suburbs, leaving behind poor and service-needy
minorities in an increasingly resource-starved city. Fischel argues that
this "death spiral" - decreasing revenue resulting in increased taxes
leading to further decreases in revenue - is cut short by the housing
market (pp. 152-53). According to Fischel, housing prices will bottom
out in towns like Camden and savvy buyers will purchase houses there
because those houses will be affordable compared to the surrounding
jurisdictions. As Fischel writes: "[P]rice cures all" (p. 153).
Price does not cure all, however, in a world of sprawl. It is not at all
clear that urban housing has a price advantage in light of the relative
ease of developing cheap land in the expanding suburbs. Nor is "price
cures all" a real answer for the citizens living in a jurisdiction like
Camden while they await a market upturn. Fischel correctly observes
that no local government is likely to go out-of-business (p. 153), but
that is actually a disadvantage of municipalities. Unlike other corpo
rate entities that can disappear, municipal corporations are a geo
graphical reality. One cannot simply ignore those people who remain
in a failing jurisdiction.
Fischel's recommendation is that the government distribute money
to those who live in distressed areas so that they can move out of a
jurisdiction and choose a better one in good Tieboutian fashion (p.
264). The cost of effective relocation, however, is prohibitively high,
and has to include investments in transportation, jobs, and community
support to be even marginally successful. Even if one wanted to redis
tribute money to individuals to exit decaying jurisdictions, one has to
convince the suburbs to lower their barriers to entry of new housing
developments. And the result of a successful relocation effort is that
those left behind are in even worse fiscal condition.41
Arguably, fiscal zoning could raise house prices in the suburbs to
such a degree that even people of some means stayed put or moved
back to the city. This comparative advantage of the decaying city,
however, is unlikely to translate into gains by existing residents. As
Fischel observes, if the poor or fixed-income resident gamers some
improvement to her city services (say, better education outcomes or
an increased property tax base), the property values in the jurisdiction
40. See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 7 1 3 (N.J.
1975).
41. See, e.g., ALBERT 0. H I RSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 100 (1970) (observing that public goods
decline rapidly upon the exit of quality-conscious consumers of that good).
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will increase (pp. 135-36). This is good news if she is willing to sell, but
bad news if she wants to stay. If she owns, she will have to pay prop
erty taxes on the new higher assessments (which she may not be able
to afford), and if she rents (which is much more likely), she will be
priced out of her home altogether.42
Ethel Lawrence, the lead plaintiff in the Mount Laurel case found
herself in this position. In the mid-1970s, Mount Laurel - a semi-rural
neighbor of Camden with ample· farmland available for suburban
development - had adopted a large-lot, single-family zoning ordi
nance that made it impossible for developers to construct affordable,
multi-family housing. The predictable result was that Mrs. Lawrence
and other low-income, mainly minority residents were being priced
out of their homes and replaced by predominantly white, middle- and
upper-income newcomers - an outcome favored by the existing large
landowners, the more recent residents of the town, and local officials.43
On Fischel's account, Mrs. Lawrence could have moved to Camden,
the nearest place where housing was affordable (though she would be
consigned to a segregated, poor, and crime-ridden neighborhood with
decaying public services). But this move, too, might have been tempo
rary. If the housing market detected any improvement in Camden's
fiscal health, wealthier newcomers would again force Mrs. Lawrence
to relocate.
One can assert a basic fairness objection to such dislocations. The
New Jersey Supreme Court certainly believed it was unjust for locali
ties to use their state-granted powers over land use to displace lower
income households.44 More important for my purposes, however, is
that Mrs. Lawrence's story suggests that the claimed benefit of decen
tralized local government - that it better fulfills individual prefer
ences - is undermined by linking local services with house values.
Recall that Fischel's thesis relies on a direct causal relationship
between the quality of local public services and local property values.
This link may encourage those who can afford it to invest in local
amenities, but it may actually create perverse incentives for lower
income persons, especially renters, to underinvest in local public
goods. Lower-income owners and renters (particularly the elderly) are
42. Tiebout's original market mechanism was criticized as a recipe for "musical sub
urbs," with the less rich chasing the rich around the metropolitan area in search of good
public services. Bruce Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Gov
ernments, 12 URB. STUD. 205 (1 975). Fischel's "price cures all" model is just the opposite a recipe for musical cities, with the richer chasing the less rich around the metropolitan re
gion. The homevoter hypothesis celebrates gentrification on a grand scale.
43. For an account of the Mount Laurel litigation, see CHARLES HAAR, SUBURBS
UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1 996), and DAVID L. KIRP ET AL.,
OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OP SUBURBIA ( 1 995). See also J. Peter Byrne,
Are Suburbs Unconstitlllional?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2265 (1997) (book review).
44. See S. Burlington County NAA CP, 336 A.2d at 723-27.
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caught in a bind: though they want and need good public services,
their desire to stay in their homes creates a fiscal incentive not to
invest in them.45 Mrs. Lawrence's concern about displacement may
well override her preference for better public services, an outcome
that could be avoided if local public services were not paid for through
the housing market but through another mechanism, such as a
progressive income tax.
Second, it is obvious that significant numbers ofpeople, unable to
afford the price to enter (or to remain in) their "preferred" jurisdic
tion, are not receiving the level of public services that they would
choose under Tieboutian conditions. As the problem of affordable
housing indicates, one's "choices" about where to live fall off dramati
cally as one moves down the income scale, particularly in times of
drastic real estate inflation. Calling Mrs. Lawrence's locational deci
sion a "choice" that balances what she is willing to pay with the serv
ices she receives mistakes the initial distribution of capital and services
across the metropolitan area with its optimal distribution.46
This points to a third consequence of linking house values to local
public services - it tends to reinforce preexisting distributions of
social and financial capital.47 Access to particular locally provided
public goods, especially personal safety and education, are the prereq
uisites for building future social and financial capital. If the quality of
local services depends on where one lives, then initial location has out
sized consequences. Residential location determines the type and
quality of the public goods that enable future mobility. The spatial dis
tribution of public goods tends to reinforce existing economic and
social hierarchies, mapping geographically the unequal distribution of
wealth.48 Under a privatized local government regime, individuals "get

45. Fischel acknowledges that renters have an incentive not to invest in local public
services, but resists the argument that rent control or other rent stabilization devices might
effectively change those incentives and turn renters into homevoters. See pp. 85-86.
46. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 9, at 422-23 (arguing that poorer ju
risdictions spend less on local services, like education, not because they have a different
"taste" for education than do wealthier jurisdictions, but because of the "inadequacy of local
taxable resources"). The Tiebout hypothesis is tautological if "preferences" includes all pos
sible variables that affect the mobility decision, including availability of employment, famil
ial ties, and resource constraints. In that case, Tiebout merely tells us that where people
"prefer" to live is where they currently live. See Harold Hochman, Individual Preferences
and Distriblllional A djustments, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 353, 359-60 ( 1972).
47. See Hochman, supra note 46, at 359-60 ("While individuals, by relocating, can miti
gate their dissatisfaction, their clustering cannot undo the dependence of their claims on ini
tial endowments of physical and human capital.").
48. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 37, at 1 966-68. In addition, concentrated seg
regation by race and income fosters a set of pathologies that are independent of the relative
quality of local services. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 38, passim; WILLIAM
JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1987).
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what they pay for,"49 and one's life chances are significantly set when
one's jurisdictional fate is sealed.
IV.

SCHOOL FUNDING

It is perhaps for this reason that the leading battleground in chal
lenging the "pay as you go" structure of local government finance has
been in the area of primary and secondary education, which has been
traditionally funded through the local property tax. Though the equal
protection challenge to school funding disparities under the federal
Constitution failed in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,50 challenges under state constitutional guarantees have
been somewhat more successful.51 Fischel spends a significant amount
of time arguing that the efforts of school funding equalization reform
ers are misguided (Chapters 5-6). He argues that local financing of
primary and secondary education results in a "race to the top" in edu
cation quality because local education spending is reflected in home
values (p. 98). School funding equalization, on the other hand, leads to
underinvestment in education because it eliminates one of the primary
bases upon which local governments compete: education spending.
Homevoters, most of whom do not have school-age children, will only
invest in education if that investment is reflected in their property
values (pp. 148-52). Equalize school funding across jurisdictions and
the homevoter will find little reason to fund schools through taxes that
will not be captured in her property values. The result will be less
spending on education and declining educational outcomes across the
board (pp. 129-33).
Fischel offers California as "proof" for this contention. He repeats
his provocative argument (which he first made in 198�2) that the
California Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Serrano v. Priest,53 which
threw out California's local property-tax-based school funding system,
caused homevoters to pass Proposition 13, one of the largest and, to its
critics, most destructive property tax revolts in the country (pp. 98128). Working from the assumption that local property-tax-funded
educational spending is capitalized into property values, Fischel argues
that it would be irrational for a homevoter to approve Proposition 13
(because it would depress home values) without some Serrano-like
push. Fischel claims that once the California Supreme Court held that
49. See Fischel, supra note 29.
50. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
51. For a general discussion of state school finance litigations, see Mildred Robinson,
Financing Educational Opportunity, 14 J .L. & POL. 483 (1 998).
52. See William A. Fischel, Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 465
(1989).
53. 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
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local governments could not spend what they wanted on education,
homevoters decided not to spend very much at all. The result has been
an overall decline in education outcomes in California, a product of
the disastrous "leveling-down" brought on by misguided court inter
fen.nce in Serrano.
The causal chain from Serrano to the current quality of education
in California is problematic, however. A recently published study
argues persuasively that the voters' approval of Proposition 13 had
little to do with Serrano, but rather was animated by a confluence of
factors, including senior citizens' fears of being priced out of their
homes by soaring tax bills, higher-income voters with little need for
government services reaping a property tax windfall, and a general
populist, anti-government sentiment that tax reformers used to their
political advantage.54 Indeed, numerous property tax revolts through
out history and in many states have been unrelated to educational
equalization.55 Property taxes are highly visible and tend to be
unpopular because they tax wealth rather than income,56 which
presented a tremendous problem in 1970's California as property
values increased dramatically.57 Fischel's thesis requires that the
Serrano decision presaged or caused noticeable reductions in home
values, and that homeowners responded by cutting their taxes so as to
starve all their local public services, not just education.
Moreover, the next step in the argument - that equalization will
lead to school underinvestment across the board - does not necessar
ily follow. School reformers, as Fischel acknowledges, have long advo
cated state funding of education, trusting that it would be both more
equitable and more substantial than the local variety (pp. 146-48).
Fischel assumes that state residents will not approve income tax or
general receipts taxes to fund schools, but empirical evidence shows
that in many states with equalization regimes, the state increases

54. See Kirk Stark & Jonathan Zasloff, Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really
Cause Proposition 13?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 801 (2003); see also GARY MILLER, CITIES BY
CONTRACT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION 3 (1981) (quoting John Ken
neth Galbraith as stating that Proposition 13 was "a revolt of the rich against the poor").
Property owners overwhelmingly favored Proposition 13, while renters, public employees,
and the majority of blacks were opposed. See id. Fischel has responded to Stark & Zasloff
with a paper entitled, Did Serrano Vote for Proposition 13?: A Reply to Stark and Zasloff's
Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13? (Aug. 2003) (working
paper No. 03-13, on file with Dartmouth Coll. Econ. Dep't).
55. See ARTHUR O'SULLIVAN ET AL., PROPERTY TAXES AND TAX REVOLTS 1 5, 32
(1995) (describing circumstances of property tax revolts in a number of states and the United
Kingdom in different historical periods and noting that forty-three states adopted new prop
erty tax limitations between 1978 and 1980).
-

56. See id. at 1 1 .
57. See MILLER, supra note 54, at 190-91; O'SULLIVAN E T AL., supra note 5 5 , at 2-3;
Frederick D. Stocker, Introduction to PROPOSITION 13: A TEN YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 1, 3
(Frederick D. Stocker ed., 1991) [hereinafter PROPOSITION 13].
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funding for poor districts, while leaving others relatively untouched.58
Certainly, one has to be cautious about the details of the school
funding scheme - some equalization programs may penalize higher
spending districts instead of supplementing lower-spending districts59
- but there is no necessary relationship between centralized funding
and reduced funding, nor centralized funding and reduced educational
outcomes.60
Indeed, on Fischel's theory, centralized funding should not make
much difference at all to homevoters concerned about local education
outcomes. As Fischel recognizes, educational quality depends in large
part on local residents taking an active interest in the management of
their schools. If capitalization is significant, the quality of a jurisdic
tionally restricted local education should still show up in home values,
regardless of how that education is funded. This may be the reason
that most suburbanites oppose vouchers, even in California.61 A
comprehensive voucher scheme encompassing suburban and city
schools might have the effect of decoupling home values and school
quality because one would not have to buy a house in the jurisdiction
to go to the schools there - a collective property right that the hous
ing market could no longer value. But the opposition to vouchers indi
cates that even in California after Serrano, suburbanites believe that
localities have something that the housing market can value - namely
the quality of a particular jurisdictionally exclusive education, never
mind where the money comes from.62 Even if Fischel is right that
58. See Sheila Murray et al., Education-Finance Reform and the Distribwion of Educa
tion Resources, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 789 (1998).
59. See Caroline M. Hoxby, All School Finance Equalizations Are Not Created Equal,
116 Q.J. ECON. 1 189 (2001). Hoxby suggests that leveling down occurs because it is cheap for
states to forbid high spending but expensive for them to supplement low spending. She ob
serves, however, that school finance equalization does not have to lead to leveling down and
that flat grant categorical aid "has almost no potential to generate leveling down." Id. at
1218.
60. In fact, state funding provides close to 50% of school revenues already. See Richard
Briffault, Our Localism: Part I
The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 , 59-60 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part I]. Fischel acknowledges that
there are ways to increase overall funding for education without undermining local district
incentives, but argues that school-finance reform involving any state funding "overlooks the
long-run impact of an increased state role in education." P. 146. Retreating from his fiscal
incentives argument, Fischel equates centralized funding with centralized control, arguing
that the state may attach strings to funds or might demand curricular reforms. Id. Addition
ally, Fischel assumes that such strings or reforms will inevitably lead to reduced educational
outcomes. See id.
-

61. See James Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 1 1 1
YALE L.J. 2043, 2062-63 (2002) (arguing that a "statewide o r even robust regional [school]
choice plan" that truly helps poor, urban students is unlikely to materialize because subur
banites are generally satisfied with their school districts and will resist any attempts to "join
them forcibly with urban districts").
62. Fischel recognizes that Californians' opposition to vouchers casts some doubt on his
Serrano thesis because it means that home values remain tied to education outcomes. Pp.
156-57. Fischel attempts to explain the fact that "Los Angeles-area school districts with bet-
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homevoters invest in education only in pursuit of higher home values,
he is wrong in asserting that the source of money matters.
The California suburbanites' opposition to vouchers indicates that
these suburbanites know something about education that Fischel does
not: that there is not a one-to-one relationship between local govern
ment budgetary inputs and local government outputs, that is, money
spent and education received. Studies show that (for a host of reasons)
it is simply more difficult and costly to educate lots of poorer students
with limited private resources than it is to educate relatively fewer
well-off students who come from families with more ample private
resources.63 This means that the local funding of education is less
significant to the political economy of the suburb than is the power of
localities to exclude entrants who might increase the cost of education
or reduce its quality, such as large or low-income families. This so
called "public goods zoning"64 looks exactly the same as "fiscal zon
ing," but its goal is slightly different, in that it is intended to control for
the characteristics of in-migrants, not for their fiscal contribution per
se.65 If the primary determinants of the quality of public goods are
what the consumers who use them bring to the table, then local gov
ernments can exert a "much greater influence over the levels of public
o utputs through policy variables that control the make-up of the com
munity than through the local budget."66
In other words, suburban house values do not primarily reflect
some portion of the value of that extra social studies teacher, but
rather the value of buying education services with others who will con
tribute to the value of those education services. Suburban housing
prices essentially set a minimum income level for users of local public
goods, house price being a proxy for overall wealth. When one buys a
house in the jurisdiction, one is buying an education-quality "user
pool"67 - the assumption being that higher-income residents will pro-

ter education numbers had higher home values, even though Serrano and Proposition 13 had
leveled the fiscal differences" by arguing that fiscal differences were reintroduced through
private funding and state categorical grants. P. 156.
·

63. See James Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999).
64. Mills & Oates, The Theory of Local Public Finance, supra note 38, at 7.
65. Id. Public goods zoning and fiscal zoning often look exactly the same, making it dif
ficult to determine to what extent a locality is engaged in one or the other. Ideally the subur
banite wants to avoid school-age children altogether. "The normal profit-maximizing strat
egy of a suburb dominated by a homeowner majority is to discourage construction of modest
priced housing for occupancy by families with school-age children and to attract blue-chip
fiscal assets like light industrial plants." Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 452 (1977) (hereinafter Ellickson, Sttbttrban
Growth Controls].
66. Mills & Oates, The Theory of Local Public Finance, supra note 38, at 7.
67. See Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participation i;1 the Production
of Local Public Goods, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 5 (2001).
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duce better (i.e., "quality-enhancing") consumers of public educa
tion.68 Education is a collectively produced good; its quality depends in
large part upon how other consumers use it. Unlike a toaster or other
consumer good, it makes a great deal of difference who is buying it
with you.
This is not to say that the money that local governments can raise
and spend through the local property tax does not matter at all.
Wealthier communities can and do spend more on education than do
poorer ones, and this money makes a difference in educational
outcomes.69 Public goods zoning and the jurisdictional monopoly,
however, do the lion's share of the work. Thus, the voters who
approved Proposition 13 believing that property tax limitations would
not affect the quality of local education were mostly right.70 Suburban
communities could still exclude low-income, higher-cost entrants
through public goods zoning and let the state pick up a much larger
portion of the education tab. In fact, it may be more accurate to say
that Proposition 13 is a mechanism by which current homeowners shift
the costs of education to newer homeowners. Under Proposition 13,
property is reassessed at the time of sale, making for significantly dif
ferent tax bills depending on how long one owns one's horne.71 Lower
taxes without a corresponding decrease in the quality of public serv
ices is the holy grail of the homevoter and it is what she got, at least in
the short term.72 This may better explain why property values
increased in California after voters passed Proposition 13.

68. See H I RSCHMAN, supra note 4 1, at 99 (discussing "quality-makers"); Fennell, supra
note 67, at 5 .
69. For evidence that increasing resources t o poorer schools generates increases in
school quality, see Thomas Dee, The Capitalization of Education Finance Reforms, 43 J.L. &
ECON. 185, 209-13 (2000).
70. See O'SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 55, at 3. Contemporaneous polls indicated that
many voters believed that current service levels would remain unchanged after Proposition
13, see id., and that if they had to choose services to reduce, they would choose welfare (54
% ), parks (26 % ), libraries (25 % ), and public transportation (21 % ). MILLER, supra note 54,
at 3. Very few mentioned schools. Id.
7 1. See O'SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 55, at 6-9, 137; George F. Break, Proposition
/J's Tenth Birthday: Occasion for Celebration or Lament?, in PROPOSITION 13, supra note
57, at 1 89-90. If one agrees with Fischel that property taxes are fully capitalized into property
values and that homevoters seek solely to maximize house values, this aspect of Proposition
13 appears to be irrational: the eventual value of the home will be reduced by the higher as
sessments when it is sold. It may simply be incorrect that homeowners seek solely to maxi
mize the value of their homes. See Brueckner & Joo, supra note 36, at 464 (arguing that
homeowners choose a level of public spending that blends their own preferences and those
of potential house buyers). It also may be incorrect that homeowners will eventually have to
account for the property tax avoided when they sell, but instead enjoy a current (untaxed)
property tax windfall. See Mildred W. Robinson, Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and
Local Fiscal Policy at the Intersection of Direct Democracy and Republicanism: The Property
Tax as Case in Point, 35 U. MICH. fL. REFORM. 5 11 , 530-32 (2002).
72. O'Sullivan notes that "'initially it was relatively easy to replace lost property tax
revenues in California because the state had a surplus to draw on" and that California resi-
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In fact, both proponents and opponents of school funding equaliza
tion have overstated its impact. School funding equalization is one
means of garnering some additional resources for poorer districts, but
it is not a panacea for the problem of educating poorer students.
Equalization alone will not alter the spatial determinants of educa
tional outcomes. Nor, contrary to Fischel's argument, does school
funding equalization unsettle the suburban political economy and lead
to disastrous underinvestment. Even after equalization, house prices
will still reflect a premium for entry into wealthier jurisdictions with
better schools, poorer (and often minority) students will still receive a
dramatically less effective education, and income will still be corre
lated with educational success.73 The homevoter - children in school
or not - will still invest in schools, but she will do so as she always
has: by investing in boundaries.
V.

THE RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP

Boundary defense is at the heart of the homevoter's political econ
omy. B ut this does not completely explain the vehemence that often
meets efforts to enforce some interlocal parity. The assumption that
homeowners will only pay taxes for goods that increase their property
values is obviously wrong - the bulk of taxes paid at the federal and
state level are unrelated to residential property values. Yet Fischel is
correct that suburbanites often believe that "their" property taxes
"belong" to them and are therefore unwilling to have "their" tax
revenue shipped-off to educate some "other" people's children (pp.
120-21) . The suburban voter is finely attuned to local crossjurisdic
tional redistributions, in a way that is somewhat at odds with the
citizenry's general tolerance for interstate or even international redis
tributions. It is difficult to get New Jerseyians upset that they subsidize
many other states by contributing more in federal income taxes than
they receive in services,74 though it is easy to get the suburb of Mount
Laurel upset about subsidizing the educational outcomes of children in
Camden. The rhetoric of local autonomy has become synonymous
with local ownership - the ownership of the collective property
within the boundaries of the jurisdiction, and ownership of the juris
dictional boundaries themselves. The suburbanite often perceives her

dents only began to feel the effects of Proposition 13 twelve to fifteen years later.
O'SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 55, at 1 16.
73. Cf Ryan, supra note 63 (arguing that education finance reform is a poor substitute
for desegregation).
74. In 1999, New Jersey residents paid $2,342 per capita more in federal taxes than they
received in federal spending. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACf OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2002, at 313 no. 462 (2002). Compare that with Alabama, which received
$2,091 per capita more in federal spending than in federal taxes paid. Id.
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borders as an entitlement, and her right to defend them through zon
ing as the core of self-rule.
This attention to local boundaries is a product of the political
economy of privatized local government. If one believes that one has
"paid" for a particular service by buying entry into a jurisdiction, then
any distribution across jurisdictional lines raises the specter that one is
not getting what one has paid for.75 The rhetoric of ownership surfaces
throughout Fischel's text: higher-tax-base school districts are the "vic
tims" of school funding equalization and are rightfully concerned
about the "expropriation" (p. 183) of "their" (pp. 101, 111) tax dollars.
As Fischel puts it, homevoters simply want to see the benefit of their
tax bills (p. 175): "It seems no more insidious than a desire to have the
plumber do the work for which you pay her. "76
Why the appropriate "owners" of a tax base and its accompanying
property tax dollars should be those who happen to reside within a
state-created local government jurisdiction is unclear, however. The
perception that taxes and services are "owned" by the residents of a
particular jurisdiction relies on a naturalized view of local boundaries,
a sense that the jurisdictional lines reflect a preexisting community
that has a "right" to its "own" tax dollars. But incorporation and land
use are governmental powers and the regional geography of frag
mented local governments is a product of legal rules. A jurisdiction's
tax base is often the result of luck, not skill - for example, having
desirable natural features like beaches or mountains that attract in
vestment, or having a large commercial tax base from one particular
industrial plant.
The presumption of ownership is even more tenuous when one
considers that the value of the tax base relative to local costs is a
product, in large part, of the power to zone that comes with jurisdic
tional boundaries in the first place.77 As Fischel recognizes, the chief
goal of most incorporating entities is to gain power over land use (p.
258). Though Fischel occasionally suggests that there is an organic or
75. Cf Bruce W. Hamilton, Property Taxes and the Tiebout Hypothesis: Some Empirical
Evidence, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, supra note 6, at 28 (arguing that
suburbanites regard their taxes as a quid pro quo for local services and not as a tax on hous
ing, and therefore consume more housing than their central-city counterparts).
76. P. 224. Fischel's conception of local government as fee-for-service operates in the
context of environmental regulation as well. He argues that poorer communities should be
able to bargain for noxious industrial sites that contribute to the local tax base. He observes
that "community residents get just as good an environment as they are willing to pay for in
fiscal benefits foregone." William A. Fischel, Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the
Location of Firms in Suburban Communities, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE
CONTROLS, supra note 6, at 166.
77. Cf EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, THE IMPACT OF ZONING ON
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY 7 (Harvard Inst. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 1948,
2002) (arguing that zoning laws are responsible for a significant portion of the difference be
tween house values and construction costs).
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civic quality to these incorporations - that these smaller governments
give " like-minded people" (p. 252) a chance to control their own
destiny - he admits that in most cases, the fiscal objectives of the
neighborhood are all that residents have in common (p. 223). This is
the lesson of the incorporations undertaken by cities and towns in Los
Angeles County in the 1950s and early 60s78 and in the Seattle region
during the 1990s. As Fischel describes it, somewhat admiringly, many
of the new towns in Kings County, Washington were born of preventa
tive agendas - incorporating to avoid being annexed to a less-affluent
area (Newcastle); to preserve its single-family zoning ordinances
(Covington); to stop the building of a new airport runway (Burien), a
new jail (Woodinville), or higher-density housing (Kent); or simply to
"stop growth" (Sammamish).79 The incorporation frenzy of the 1990s
in Kings County is a story of "defensive" incorporations in the shadow
of a state legislature pursuing a regional growth agenda that would
have required modifications to local zoning laws.
By incorporating and gaining local power over land use decisions,
neighborhoods can insulate themselves from costs and generate
increased revenue.80 In a Tieboutian world, resources and demands for
resources begin evenly distributed. In the real world, resources and
demands for resources are already spatially determined. The city and
inner-ring suburbs simply have more people in need of social services,
poor or rich. Crime and poverty are not evenly distributed but are
spatially concentrated in specific higher-cost or lower-cost geogra
phies. As suburbanites realized quite early on, geography itself is an
effective substitute for services. Simply by moving away - from a
more densely to a less densely populated area - the homeowner can
reduce the need for public services. The drawing of boundaries be
tween high- and low-cost geographies has obvious distributional ef
fects, depriving high-cost geographies of revenue that was once
"theirs" and creating a new corporate entity that now "owns" that
revenue.
There is no normative basis, however, for privileging one set of
owners over another set of owners - the drawing of the jurisdictional
78. Pp. 220-28. These were the so-called Lakewood Plan Cities. For a powerful critique
of Lakewood Plan cities, see MILLER, supra note 54. Miller's thesis is that the primary moti
vation for Lakewood Plan cities was the creation of enclaves where taxpayers could escape
from the redistributional patterns of old-line cities. Id. at 77. As Miller argues, most
Lakewood Plan cities developed under the threat of annexation because incorporation with
low or zero property tax was more favorable than annexation to a city with a large tax base
and ample public services, but with high property tax rates. Id. at 79-82.
79. See pp. 241-51 ; cf MILLER, supra note 54, at 77-82.
80. See MILLER, supra note 54, at 47, 59, 77-78 (discussing the blatant fiscal ambitions of
towns like Commerce and Industry and arguing that "Lakewood Plan citizens benefited
through an 'externalization' of the costs of local government"). Lakewood Plan cities were
not just low-property-tax havens; they were, in many cases, no-property-tax havens or, as
Miller calls them, "minimal cities." Id. at 83-85.
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lines is itself a distributional choice. Consider the relatively well-off
suburb of Mount Laurel and its relationship to neighboring Camden.
If the quality of public services turns on the relative wealth of the resi
dents, then it makes perfect sense for Mount Laurel to seek out
wealthier residents and use zoning to force the relatively poor (like
Mrs. Lawrence) to go somewhere else. In order for Mount Laurel to
cater to the relatively wealthy, however, there must be somewhere for
the relatively less wealthy to go. The low-cost, resource-rich jurisdic
tion cannot exist without its neighbor and opposite - the high-cost,
resource-poor twin - because the only way to get the former is to
exclude the class of potential residents who will populate the latter.
Mount Laurel exists because it has the legal ability to displace lower
income residents to neighboring Camden or other neighboring juris
dictions. To treat Mount Laurel as an autonomous owner of "its"
property tax base is to ignore its necessarily parasitic relationship with
neighboring jurisdictions.81
Moreover, the rhetoric of local autonomy effectively hides the
transfer of wealth from Camden to Mount Laurel. Suburban land use
regimes increase property values in the suburbs and depress them in
neighboring, poorer communities by continuing to displace poorer
people into urban cores.82 By excluding lower-income arrivals (or,
indeed, any cost-imposing arrivals at all), Mount Laurel can shift those
costs to Camden. This reduction in suburban costs (which translates
into added property values) is not "earned" and "paid for" in any way.
Instead, jurisdictional boundaries result in a windfall for first-in-time
homeowners, who realize often significant capital gains when their
jurisdiction obtains the legal power to zone out cost-imposing new
comers.83 The actual cash transfer is made by new home buyers, which
may be why new homeowners are often the most NIMBY residents of
all. Recent homeowners are eager to jump on the exclusionary band
wagon to preserve the value of their just-purchased asset and perhaps
to realize the capital gain of a new, more restrictive zoning regime.84
81. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part /, supra note 60, at 39-58; Richard Schragger, The
Limits of Localism, 1 00 MICH. L. REV. 371 , 416-429 (2001).
82. See Schragger, supra note 81, at 4 16-29; cf MILLER, supra note 54, at 179 ("The
sorting out of people that accompanied the incorporation of the Lakewood Plan cities was
not a neutral process in which people with different tastes found each other under sympa
thetic local governments, but a political process in which resources were redistributed.");
William Neenan, Suburban-Central City Exploitation Thesis: One City 's Tale, 23 NAT'L TAX
J. 117 (1 970) (arguing that if benefits are measured by willingness to pay, suburban Detroit
will receive welfare gains at the expense of Detroit).
83. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls, supra note 65, at 400.
84. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 15, at 29 (observing that " [i]n order to extract a fiscal
dividend, present residents of a community will try to limit entry to individuals with incomes
higher than theirs"); GLAESER & GYOURKO supra note 77, at 7 (zoning and other land use
controls are responsible for high housing costs). Glaeser and Gyourko advocate loosening
current zoning laws, but recognize that it is politically difficult because current homeowners
,
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The asserted power to exclude is a government entitlement with
significant distributional repercussions, and one which the Supreme
Court has implicitly adopted without challenge since upholding a
standard zoning ordinance in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. in
1926.85 The Court has rejected subsequent equal protection challenges
to zoning, declaring that "a quiet place where yards are wide, people
few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land
use project addressed to family needs."86 In Warth v. Seldin,87 the most
direct challenge to exclusionary zoning, the Court held that low- and
moderate-income urban residents seeking housing in a neighboring
exclusive suburb had no standing to challenge the suburb's exclusion
ary zoning ordinance, because they did not own property there. Two
education cases, Rodriguez,88 noted above, and Milliken v. Bradley,89
reinforced the j urisdictional wall between high- and low-cost geogra
phies by drawing significant protective lines around the suburbs - the
first by rejecting a federal equal protection-based school funding
equalization claim; the second by striking down a cross-jurisdictional
integration remedy that would have permitted busing across the
city/suburb border.
Fischel praises localities' legal power to exclude. The advantage of
local government over state government, argues Fischel, is that local
government can set prices for entry (p. 54). By contrast, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that states do not have the power to condi
tion eritry into the j urisdiction on an individual's ability (or inability)
to pay. States, the Court declared most recently in Saenz v. Roe90
which struck down a California residency requirement that paid
welfare benefits to newcomers for one year at the amount they would
have been paid in their state of origin - "do not have any right to
select their citizens."91 Local governments, on the other hand, have
gotten a "free pass" to do so, as Fischel himself observes (p. 54).
There is a significant disjuncture between the Supreme Court's
holding in Worth that low-income residents do not have standing to
challenge their complete exclusion from a neighboring locality and its
holding in Saenz that low-income residents have a fundamental right
to enter California that cannot be burdened even minimally by a
-

in high house value areas would "lose substantially" the added property value those laws
generate. Id. at 22.
85. 272 U .S. 365 (1926).
86. Viii. of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
87. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
88. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
89. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
90. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
91. Saenz. 526 U.S. at 5 1 1 .
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year's welfare payment differential.92 The Supreme Court, it appears,
has granted local boundaries a heightened status - one that tends to
reflect and reinforce the suburbanite's sense of collective j urisdictional
ownership. This sense of entitlement contributes to a suburban
myopia, which Fischel seems to share at times. The suburbanite often
does not see the complex web of state and federal funds that makes
her lifestyle possible, including the federal mortgage-interest tax
deduction that makes her home significantly cheaper to buy and the
federal highway funds that make her commute possible.93 The subur
banite bristles at the idea that she should pay entrance fees (in the
form of commuter taxes) to contribute to the upkeep of city services,
though she feels perfectly comfortable crossing jurisdictional lines to
take advantage of employment and cultural opportunities there.94 And
the suburbanite often behaves as if property value increases that are a
product of the state-given power to incorporate and zone are "earned"
and not "taken," but contrary state attempts to distribute localized
property taxes to poorer neighbors are "taken" and not "earned."
In a political economy of privatized local government, homeown
ership is considered a right, and homeownership where "yards are
wide and people few" - as the Supreme Court stated in Village of
Belle Terre - a constitutional value. Exclusion has hardened into a
political and constitutional entitlement, successfully defended through
the rhetoric of local autonomy and freedom of choice.
VI.

REFORMING LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Despite Fischel's praise for decent,ralized, property-based local
government, he too is concerned about the homeowner's destructive
incentives. After celebrating the structure of home-values-based local
government, Fischel advocates a set of reforms in his last chapter that
could have been preceded by a critique of the homevoter's political
economy. Fischel's reforms include home-value insurance to encour
age NIMBY voters to accept unwanted land uses (pp. 268-70),
property-tax exemptions for the elderly (p. 263), and a "costly" state
funded "public school supplement" that would subsidize the education
92. See Schragger, supra note 81 , at 468-69. Challenges to exclusionary zoning grounded
in a constitutional right to travel were asserted in the 1 970s, see Ellickson, Suburban Growth
Controls. supra note 65, at 470 n.247, but have since been abandoned.
93. The combined tax expenditures related to homeownership added up to around $103
billion in 2001. See Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 1 1 2 YALE L.J. 617, 631 n.61 (2002) (col
lecting data). For an argument that federal and state governments have subsidized suburban
development through roadway expenditures costing billions of dollars, see Oliver Pollard
III, Smart Growth and Sustainable Transportation: Can We Get There From Here?, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 529, 1532-35 (2002).
94. For a discussion of the rationale for "commuter taxes" in the context of the Wash
ington, D.C. area, see Robert P. Strauss, The Income of Central City and Suburban Immi
grants: A Case Study of the Washington D. C. Metropolitan Area, 51 NAT'L TAX J. 493 (1998).
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of poorer students (pp. 279-80). Fischel also recommends state and
regional review of local land-use decisions, admitting that "[t]here is
something to be said, then, for having some monitoring of local deci
sions by a state or metropolitan body" (p. 282). And he advocates a
more robust role for courts in policing exclusionary zoning regimes
through substantive due process and regulatory takings doctrines.95
Fischel's newfound respect for state and federal judges, whom he
attacked earlier in the book for their forays into school funding
equalization, nicely illustrates the unresolved tensions in his theory.
There is something incongruous about embracing a majoritarian,
decentralized political economy that requires fiscal zoning and then
deputizing unelected judges to police - much more aggressively than
they do now - the limits of that political economy. Perhaps Fischel's
substantive commitment to individual property rights trumps his
commitment to localism. Fischel has always advocated a pro
development regulatory takings doctrine and in past works has
targeted local governments as particularly egregious infringers of indi
vidual property rights.96
One possibility is that Fischel's embrace of local government is
opportunistic. As Joan Williams has argued, localism has historically
been deployed in pursuit of substantive political programs and is de
fined and limited by those programs, whatever their political flavor.97
Fischel might not be bothered by this observation: he would likely
admit that he favors local government only insofar as it gets him to the
policy outcomes - including, quite predominantly, the protection of
private property - that he desires. Decrying his use (or disuse) of lo
calism when it suits him may not be a criticism that stings.
Fischel's "tough love" reforms, however, raise a more serious
question about the coherence of a political economy that is based on
- and which incentivizes - exclusion. Fischel is quite prepared to jet
tison local, democratic decisionmaking in order to ameliorate the
homevoter's tendency to engage in inefficient or "bad" exclusion.98
Why not instead challenge the underlying political economy that
creates the fiscal incentive to exclude in the first place?
95. Pp. 282-85; see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULA TORY TAKINGS 325-68 (1995).
96. See FISCHEL, supra note 95, at 138-39; 292-94. Fischel has been accused of "localism
bashing" in the past. See Carol Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1 13 1
( 1996) (reviewing FISCHEL, supra). He asserts that his "present book might be viewed as a
defensive response to . . . [Rose's] comment." P. x.
97. See Joan Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government:
The Politics of City Status in A merican Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 83-87.
98. The line between "good" and "bad" exclusion is a difficult one to draw. When de
ciding how much exclusion is too much, Fischel seems to take both efficiency and distribu
tional concerns into account, writing "When enough . . . [local governments zone for exces
sively low-density residential uses], it contributes to metropolitan area sprawl and deters
lower-income households from finding homes in the suburbs." P. 229.
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In fact, though Fischel's reforms - many of which make sense seem to skirt the carefully calibrated system of homevoter incentives,
on closer inspection their combined effect substantially undermines
the link between home values and public services that is the center
piece of the homevoter's political economy. Consider, for example,
Fischel's proposal for home-value insurance to deter "inefficient
NIMBYism" (p. 269). This insurance would be used to compensate
homeowners for any loss of appreciation in house values caused by an
incoming development (or incoming racial minorities), and it seems a
sensible way to reduce the homevoter's risk-aversion to unwanted but
regionally necessary land uses. One problem with such insurance is
that it has not been proven to work.99 But even if it did, home-value
insurance seems contrary to the incentive structure Fischel has taken
such pains to elaborate. The obvious and intended effect of the insur
ance - eliminating the fear of reductions in property values undermines the very incentive motivating "good" or "efficient NIM
BYism" - fear of reductions in property values. Home-value insur
ance seems to miss the point. If it is true that homevoters exclude too
much because their primary asset is their homes, then why not con
sider policies that encourage diversification? For example, one might
want to reduce Americans' overinvestment in housing by eliminating
the tax incentives that privilege home ownership over other forms of
tenure.
More obviously, a good policymaker might want to reject the local
property tax as the dominant source of local funding in an effort to
decouple house values from local service provision altogether. '00
Fischel's state-funded education "supplement" (which he calls a "Tie
bout voucher" (p. 279)) certainly implies significant statewide funding
of education. When combined with his proposal for state and judicial
oversight of local land use decisions, Fischel's localism looks increas
ingly like something the most die-hard proponent of regionalism could
love. Once localities' land use decisions are subject to reasonable limi
tations and significant state funds are directed into educating poorer
students, few would argue that localities should not exercise other
traditional police powers, though one can legitimately ask how much
remains for them to do.
The lesson I draw from the homevoter hypothesis is one that
Fischel might find perverse, but it follows from his own reformist

99. Fischel acknowledges that "such insurance is difficult to write." P. 269; see Bell &
Parchomovsky, supra note 37, at 2005-09 (observing that home equity insurance has had
mixed success in stemming white flight and that it is "a less-than-ideal remedy to the prob
lem of dynamic resegregation").
100. Richard Ford has suggested this in an effort to combat racial segregation. See Ford,
note 30, at 1849-57. Others have challenged reliance on the local property tax as well.
See Poindexter, supra note 10, at 648-56.
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agenda: our current localism and the fiscal inequities that accompany
it can only be tempered by some form of state- or regionwide input.
The conception of the atomistic, self-sufficient suburban political actor
does not track life in diffuse metropolitan regions with overlapping
jurisdictions and redundant lines of authority and fiscal responsibil
ity .101 And there is a growing consensus that competition for tax base
and the search for developable land ever farther from jobs and urban
centers is a costly and mutually destructive enterprise resulting in
sprawling landscapes, failing infrastructure, and gargantuan
commutes. A different model of government and politics is necessary
to take into account the interdependencies of regional actors and the
social costs of local behavior.
Whether this new model comes in the form of public authorities
with power over regionwide infrastructure development or redistribu
tion,102 regional legislatures that serve as sites for a more expansive
politics,103 or institutionalized reforms that encourage interlocal coop
eration104 or remedy interlocal spillover effects,105 most observers of
American local government agree that the social costs of the existing
suburbanized mode of providing essential public services are too high.
Indeed, Fischel's suggestions for reform illustrate nicely that the
spectrum of scholarly debate over the appropriate limitations on local
power is much narrower than at first it might appear.
CONCLUSION

In the end, Fischel is not so much opposed to reforming local
government as he is committed to the background ideal of a market
model of local services. This commitment has a strikingly utopian
quality. Despite recognizing some flaws at the margins, Fischel tells an
upbeat, positive story about the state of local governance in the
United States. Indeed, readers who skip the final chapter will have the
distinctly Panglossian sense that "everything is as it should be."

101. See generally Gerald Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253
(1993).
102. See Sheryll Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000) (advocating region
wide governments in an effort to equalize the distribution of resources).
103. See Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 1 15 HARV. L. REV. 1763 (2002)
(advocating regional legislatures to create a region-wide politics as a supplement to local
politics).
1 04. See Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1 90 (2001) (advocating contracting to resolve persistent interlocal spillover effects and sug
gesting that changes in organizational structure can foster more interlocal bargaining).
105. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls, supra note 65 (proposing that cities af
fected by exclusionary zoning be permitted to sue neighboring suburbs for damages).
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Fischel, however, gives us hints throughout the text that something
more than a hardheadedness about human motivations and a faith in
markets animates his glowing portrait of American local government.
Fischel is also something of a romantic, an admirer - as he writes of the "pluck" of those who set out to create their own governments,
and a believer in the "uniquely American process of bottom-up, local
self-governance" (p. 260). This belief in local "pluck" and an obstinate
faith in the rationality of residential property owners produces the
"homevoter" - the new American freeholder, reimagined as a
crusading corporate shareholder in the market for good government.
This resurgence of the freeholder as the engine of good govern
ment should not come as a complete surprise: the conventional politi
cal wisdom that only property owners could be trusted with self
government lasted well into the twentieth century.106 In Fischel's
hands, this civic republican ideal has a more corporate and instrumen
tal feel: homeowners are analogized to shareholders and local gov
ernments are analogized to private, profitmaking corporations. The
twenty-first-century freeholder participates in local government in
order to defend and enhance shareholder value.
This conception of American self-reliance and market self
sufficiency is attractive. The result of treating local government as a
market good is that consent is perfect (at least at the point of pur
chase). Moving into (or exiting) a jurisdiction is the public analogue of
purchasing a good on the private market; the citizen-consumer who
buys in a particular jurisdiction has affirmed that this is the service
bundle she wants at the price she is willing to pay. Privatized local
government is the perfect Lockean government: sealed not by the
primordial social contract, but by the ubiquitous real estate contract.
It bears remembering, however, that our current structure of frag
mented local government is not the end-product of some idealized
market process, but rather the historically contingent result of the de
ployment of legal and political power. Fischel proceeds from an
understanding of the homevoter as a self-interested, wealth
maximizing rational actor and then describes a government designed
to leverage her singular interest in the value of her home. But the
homevoter is not born fully formed - she is made by particular eco
nomic, sociological, legal, and historical forces. Reinforcing the link
106. See, e.g., H arper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 684-85 (1966)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
It is also arguable, indeed it was probably accepted as sound political theory by a large per
centage of Americans through most of our history, that people with some property have a
deeper stake in community affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more educated,
more knowledgeable, more worthy of confidence, than those without means, and that the
community and Nation would be better managed if the franchise were restricted to such citizens.
Id.
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between property values and local government encourages the selfish,
property-protecting instincts of the suburban homeowner who is
locked into a set of choices by the current economics of home owner
ship. She forswears fiscal and public goods zoning at great financial
risk and embraces a socioeconomically and racially integrated com
munity at her peril. These legal/economic constraints contribute to a
path dependent housing market, driven by the limitations of existing
zoning and planning regulations, and reinforced by the romanticized
portrayal of suburban homeownership.
The result is that government services are increasingly available
only to those who can afford them, and that those who lose out in the
property value game - renters, families searching for affordable
housing, the urban poor, the fixed income - are increasingly isolated.
That there are losers - that the benefits of local autonomy, under
stood as local ownership, tend to accrue to those who already have
resources - is unsurprising considering the political history of subur
banized local power in the last half of the twentieth century. When
seen from this vantage, the resulting portrait of American local gov
ernment looks far more troubling.

